CurrenT aFFairs

one year.” Yet, as it turned out ‘a short time’ would be a matter of hours. The very next day, troops were withdrawn, with the apparent suddenness of the move making it appear to many that the US had blown the whistle, causing the Turkish army to race back to barracks. The way events played out infuriated the Turkish opposition parties who had been calling for war for over a year, with some even fantasising about permanent occupation as far south as Kirkuk. A week’s slaughter was not enough, the National Action Party (MHP) and Republican Peoples’ Party (CHP) declared, accusing the army of bowing to US pressure. This was an unprecedented event in Turkish politics. The MHP and CHP have long presented themselves as the champions of Turkish arms, with the secular CHP in particular aligning itself with the generals against the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), with its Islamist roots. While the MHP has sought to distance itself from the CHP on the religious question, it has long been a champion of brute force when it comes to the nation’s Kurds. The military responded harshly to the opposition’s allegations, with Buyukannit describing criticism as “low brow” and damaging to the military’s reputation. In the rather limited rhetorical universe of the nationalists, allegations of treachery were naturally not long in coming. The row continued, only being finally obliterated by another equally shocking announcement: the public prosecutor’s office announced that it was moving forward with an attempt to ban the government. This surprise move hangs on the accusation that the AKP has been undermining Turkey’s secular order. It now goes to the Constitutional Court for it to decide whether to proceed further. A result is not expected for some time, but the shockwaves are already shaking Ankara. Some have linked the proposed prosecution to the rightwing Ergenokon party. One suggestion is that Ergenekon’s tentacles may extend far into the judiciary. Others see the closure case as more rooted in secularist fears provoked by the debate earlier this year over the legalisation of the Islamic headscarf in Turkey’s universities. The AKP had pushed this, with MHP support, to the point where a confused bill was passed by parliament in February ending a long-standing ban on religious headgear – although the bill’s constitutional status is still in dispute. Whatever the case, Turkey is now in a position where its governing party may be shut down. This is not an entirely remote possibility either, as the courts banned
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both of the AKP’s previous incarnations, the Virtue Party and the Welfare Party, on the same grounds. A constitutional crisis would likely result. Meanwhile, the courts are also pondering banning the main pro-Kurdish party in parliament, the Democratic Society Party (DTP), while both the CHP and MHP, it could be argued, broke the rules over criticising the military in the follow-up to Operation Sun. The future may be bright then for Turkish lawyers, though there are few glimmers of sunshine for many others. The uncertainty caused by this outbreak of wrangling has also hit the economy, with the Istanbul stock exchange falling 7.5% on news of the AKP prosecution and the Turkish lira taking an unusual tumble against the dollar and euro.

The origins of the Deep State can be traced back to the late Ottoman Empire in the early 20th century and the decades that followed the formation of the Turkish republic in 1923
though social upheaval in a bid to provoke a military intervention in 2009. Ergenekon is the most recent criminal organisation to be placed under the spotlight of the state security forces, with such other clandestine criminal groups as Atabeyler, Sauna and Unraniye unearthed over the last two years. That such groups remain largely intact derives from the power and influence of their leadership. The serpent’s head – as one analyst put it – is widely believed to include members of the judiciary and bureaucracy along with retired and possibly active members of Turkey’s security services. Veli Kucuk, a retired general and the alleged founder of an illicit intelligence unit in Turkey’s gendarmerie, was for instance detained as part of the Ergenekon sweep. “It is hard to draw a frontier. We are talking about a state within a state,” says political analyst and columnist Cengiz Candar, when asked about the depth and penetration of the Deep State in Turkey. The Susurluk incident of 1996, in which a member of parliament, senior police officer and fugitive ultranationalist were discovered in the same car following an accident, revealed that elements in Turkey’s national security apparatus employ gangs to do their dirty work for them. The origins of the Deep State can be traced back to the late Ottoman Empire in the early 20th century and the decades that followed the formation of the Turkish republic in 1923. “Certain acts had to be committed but not under the signature of the authorities of the time, including ethnic cleansing and a dirty battle against communism,” according to Volkan Aytar, a programme officer responsible for security sector reform at the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV). “In the early 1900s the project of forging a nation state necessitated the cleansing of the non-Muslim elements,” said Cengiz Candar. Rightwing criminals and mercenaries were then used to take out members of the Armenian terrorist organisation known as ASALA in the 1970s and 1980s and members

Turkey’s darkest shadow
The detention in late January of 33 alleged members of a Turkish ultra-nationalist gang known as Ergenekon and consequent trial proceedings has caused a stir in Turkey. The gang’s linkage to a shadowy organisation known as ‘the Deep State’ – a group of powerful individuals bent on protecting the sacrosanctity of the secularist republic by whatever means necessary – has triggered debate amongst intellectuals and the Turkish media. anThony skinner reports
he level of public interest derives from the case presented by the prosecution, accusing the gang of disrupting public order and attempting to take over the state. A hit-list of prominent Turkish intellectuals and political figures, including Nobel Laureate Orhan Pamuk and Osman Baydemir, mayor of Diyarbakir and a member of the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP), was discovered during a previous police raid. The prosecution alleges that the gang intended to ferment national chaos

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of the separatist Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the 1990s. The neo-nationalist flame is still burning. Adherents are equally committed to the territorial integrity of Turkey and determined to eradicate any perceived threats – no matter how innocuous – to the Republic. The Deep State was implicated in a number of recent assassinations, including that of Armenian/Turkish journalist Hrant Dink in January 2007. Suspicions abound that the shadowy organisation was behind the failed plot to assassinate elected officials, including President Abdullah Gul in January 2008. That clandestine nationalist groups have tried to stoke conflict between the secularist establishment and conservatives is also apparent. Most political commentators agree that the Deep State fuelled tensions between old school secularists and the government in the run-up to the 2007 presidential elections – by supporting and arranging public rallies – in a bid to dislodge the AKP from power. The actions of individuals have also been apparent. Alparslan Arslan, the assassin of a senior judge in an attack against the Council of State in May 2006, claimed to have acted to protest the ban on headscarves in schools and universities, pitting Turkey’s staunch secularists against a government that has long supported the removal of the ban. But subsequent police investigations revealed that the assassin was in fact a neo-nationalist, fronting as an Islamist conservative. Whether the Justice and Development Party (AKP) will ever be able to land the

shadowy organisation a knockout punch is subject to question. “I have no doubt that Prime Minister Erdogan wants to put an end to the Deep State. If he had the power to do so he would not hesitate,” according to Cengiz Candar. “The question is whether they (the government) have the power and the balls.” Previous governments had refrained from prying open this Pandora’s Box and the AKP has yet to prove its unwavering commitment by doing so. The government failed to pursue the masterminds behind the bombing of a bookstore belonging to a convicted Kurdish activist in Semdinli in November 2005, in which two gendarmerie intelligence officers were caught at the scene but eventually let off the hook. The chasm between the religiously conservative AKP and the state – consisting of Turkey’s staunchly secularist elite – will make the task no easier. The prospects of a closely coordinated purge of Deep State members from state institutions are diminished by the fact that staunchly secularist judges, senior bureaucrats and members of the military want to keep the AKP at arms length, fearing the erosion of the secularist republic and establishment of an Islamic regime in Turkey. The situation is further complicated by the fact that neither the state nor the AKP have been able to adopt an internally homogenous stance on how to tackle the Deep State. “Reforms have to move in a synchronised and parallel way in terms of rights, liberties and the judiciary. Otherwise the Deep State will always will be able to slip through a hole,” said TESEV’s Vokan Ay-

(l) Turkish operations against the pkk ceased after talks between ankara and washington. (r) orhan pamuk, Turkey’s nobel literature laureate, is believed to be a target of the “state within a state”

The judiciary still takes a state-centred approach. Many judges cling to Kemalist notions and still see themselves as the protectors of the state first and foremost
tar. The judiciary still takes a state-centred approach. Many judges cling to Kemalist notions and still see themselves as the protectors of the state first and foremost, where individual rights come second,” according to Aytar. That such prominent authors and journalists as Elif Safak and now deceased Hrant Dink have been prosecuted under article 301, which criminalises insults to ‘Turkishness’ under the Turkish Penal Code, testifies to as much while also perpetuating the worst form of nationalism in Turkey. But there is cause for cautious optimism, underlined by the current trial of alleged Ergenekon gang members. The fact that the ruling AKP won a robust political mandate through its landslide victory in 2007 and retains a determined and competent leader in the form of Prime Minister Erdogan is essential. But no one relishes the thought of shining a light into Turkey’s darkest shadow. n
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